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Abstract 
 
Organizations have become increasingly concerned with developing and protecting their 
information security systems. Despite attempts to secure the information infrastructure, 
employees inside of organizations remain the largest source of threat to information cyber-
security. While previous research has focused on behavioral and situational factors that influence 
cyber-security behaviors, the measurement of cyber behaviors and their relationship to other 
performance variables is poorly understood. The purpose of the present study is to 1) determine 
the underlying factor structure of a cyber-security behavior scale, 2) assess if individual 
personality traits predict four types of cyber-security behaviors: security assurance, security 
compliance, security risk, and security damaging behaviors, and 3) explore the relationship 
between citizenship and counterproductive work behaviors and cyber-security behaviors. Results 
indicate that cyber-security behavior can be separated into four distinct dimensions and that 
personality traits such as conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness to experience are 
predictive of these behaviors. Additionally, positive cyber behaviors are related organizational 
citizenship behaviors, and potentially harmful cyber behaviors related to counterproductive work 
behaviors. This research has implications for using personality to predict cyber-security 
behaviors and reduce insider threat in the workplace. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
In an increasingly digital age, organizations continue to acquire more digital assets and 
move their information and communications to online networks. With this shift in information 
location comes a new kind of threat: cyber-security. Instead of a concern for information loss 
through the theft of physical files, organizations face the potential loss of information and assets 
via the cyber world, be it through internal or external sources. In the face of evolving technology 
and imminent threats to information, organizations find it increasingly difficult predict the types 
of risks they may face (Pfleeger & Caputo, 2012; Warkentin & Willison, 2009). Organizations 
implement security systems through various technologies to ensure that their information is 
protected against attackers and other organizations, however even the most intensive security 
measures can be compromised if the organization’s employees are behaving in such a way that 
poses risks to information cyber-security.  
Past research shows that internally-based threats (i.e. employees, insiders) are at present 
the largest threat to an organization’s information (e.g. Hu, Dinev, Hart, & Cooke, 2012; Stanton 
et al., 2005; Van Kessel, 2008; Warkentin & Willison, 2009), and employee actions make up the 
primary reason for losses of company information (CSI computer crime and security survey, as 
cited in Hu et al., 2012). In fact, 59% of past employees have admitted to stealing confidential 
information from their organization (Symantec & Ponemon, 2009). In the current study, the term 
“employee” refers to both end users and information technology employees. End users view an 
organization’s information systems as a mechanism to perform work-related responsibilities, 
2 
 
while IT employees are responsible for overseeing those systems. Both groups are included 
because both have the potential to help or harm the organization via the information security 
systems. Organizational cyber-security infrastructure must not only ensure the stability of a 
company’s hardware and software protection, but also strive to create a workforce that promotes 
positive cyber-security habits and prohibits behaviors that could put an organization at risk in the 
cyber realm.  
Consequently, employees’ cyber-security behaviors have recently drawn much attention 
from scholars, and as such, behaviors have direct implications for security in organizations. Past 
research suggests that many factors such as: organizational norms, security awareness, 
motivation, leadership, and organizational culture; affect an employee’s propensity to engage in 
actions that could either protect an organization’s digital information or put it at risk (Guo et al., 
2011; Guo et al., 2013; Hu et al., 2012; Padayachee, 2012). As an alternative to demonstrating 
factors that influence these current employee cyber-security behaviors, organizations with 
special concerns for protecting their digital information may be able to proactively select 
employees who will engage in behaviors to protect the organization’s digital assets. Using 
personality to identify these individuals is one option for organizations, and has not been 
explored fully in previous research, though it may prove an important avenue in the cyber-
security realm. This research seeks to fill that gap, and open a new line of research into the 
selection of “cyber-security champions.” Additionally, it remains unclear if cyber behaviors are 
merely forms of citizenship and counterproductive work behaviors, or if they are distinct work 
behaviors that should be studied as such. This thesis seeks to understand the factor structure 
underlying cyber-security behaviors, identify personality characteristics that are associated with 
these behaviors, and explore the relationship between these behaviors and organizational 
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citizenship and counterproductive work behaviors. The primary purposes of this study are to 1) 
analyze the underlying factor structure of a new cyber-security scale, 2) investigate the 
relationships between cyber-security behaviors, personality, organizational citizenship behaviors, 
and counterproductive work behaviors. 
Defining Cyber-Security Behaviors 
Scholars have noted that there is much disagreement about how cyber-security behaviors 
are best conceptualized (Guo, 2013). See Table 1 for a summary of the taxonomies discussed in 
the following section. Some studies have emphasized predicting and identifying positive cyber 
behaviors, while others focus on predicting negative behaviors. This method of research, 
however, may be problematic because antecedents of positive behaviors, like policy compliance, 
may be inherently distinct from antecedents of negative, risky cyber behaviors. Loch, Carr, and 
Warkentin (1992) defined a four-dimensional model of threats, such that the type of threat 
depends on the source (internal or external), perpetrator (human or non-human), intention 
(intentional or accidental), and consequences (disclosure of information, modification, 
destruction, or denial of service). Similarly, Im and Baskerville (2005) stated that threats caused 
by people are either accidental or deliberate. They further clarified that deliberate threats involve 
two components: mode and motive. Modes of carrying out the threat involve physical assault of 
the system, falsification, malicious code, and cracking of the security infrastructure. Motive can 
be fraud, espionage, or vandalism (Im & Baskerville, 2005). 
Stanton, Stam, Mastrangelo, and Jolton (2005) adopted a two-factor taxonomy of end 
user security behaviors: user expertise and user intentions. Every cyber-security behavior 
performed by employees involves some amount of technical expertise on the employee’s part, 
ranging from little expertise to expert knowledge of computers and software systems. The second 
4 
 
dimension, user intentions, captures the intentionality of the behaviors, ranging from benevolent 
to malicious intentions (Stanton et al., 2005). Based on interviews conducted with information 
security technology professionals, managers, and regular employees, they defined six categories 
of cyber-security behaviors arranged along the two dimensions of expertise and intentions 
(Stanton et al., 2005). These six categories include intentional destruction, detrimental misuse, 
dangerous tinkering, naïve mistakes, aware assurance, and basic hygiene (Stanton et al, 2005).  
Intentional destruction behavior involves a relatively high level of expertise paired with 
intentions to harm the organization’s information infrastructure. An example of such a behavior 
would be an employee who breaks into an organization’s protected files to steal information 
(Stanton et al., 2005). Detrimental misuse does not require a high level of technical expertise, but 
still includes an intention of harm, possibly through “annoyance, harassment, rule breaking etc.” 
(Stanton et al., 2005, p. 126). For example, an employee might use the company email to send 
spam to market a sideline business. Dangerous tinkering, unlike intentional destruction and 
detrimental misuse, does not involve a clear intention of harm. These behaviors require technical 
expertise and an example of such a behavior involves an employee who “configures a wireless 
gateway that inadvertently allows wireless access to the company’s network by people in passing 
cars” (Stanton et al., 2005, p. 126). Naïve mistakes require minimal expertise and no intention to 
do harm, however these actions still pose a potential risk to the organization. For example, an 
employee might choose an insecure password for their computer, such as “password” or their 
birthday.  
Aware assurance and basic hygiene behaviors tend to help the organization and are 
viewed as behaviors that the organization seeks to promote. Aware assurance behaviors involve a 
high level of expertise combined with the intentions of protecting the organization’s information 
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technology. An example of such a behavior would be an employee who, by monitoring of their 
work computer, recognizes the presence of a backdoor program that would allow illegal access 
to the information on their computer. Lastly, basic hygiene behaviors require little expertise but 
include a clear intention to protect, and would involve an employee who refuses to reveal their 
password to an unknown caller claiming to be from computer services. By creating these 
categories, Stanton et al. (2005) were able to organize specific behaviors into a manageable 
taxonomy. They specifically clarify that individuals who engage in one type of behavior may 
also engage in other types of behaviors. This taxonomy may help with assessing security related 
behaviors, and provides a useful framework for further classifying specific behaviors into 
broader categories in order to more manageably identify employees who tend to practice 
different cyber-security behaviors.  
Seeing the need for further reconceptualization of cyber-related behaviors, Guo (2013) 
organized a new framework based on dimensions used in the current cyber literature. Guo (2013) 
used five dimensions: intentionality, motive, expertise, job relatedness, and consequence. Guo 
(2013) suggested that employees intentionally or unintentionally engage in a given behavior, 
may have malicious or non-malicious motive, and may have varying degrees of information 
technology expertise. Additionally, some behaviors may be more related to an employee’s job 
than others. Lastly, employee cyber-related behaviors can have a range of consequences for the 
organization, ranging from improved security to direct damage to the organization.  
Using those dimensions, Guo (2013) classified information security-related behavior into 
four categories: security assurance behaviors (SABs), security compliant behaviors (SCBs), 
security risk-taking behaviors (SRBs), and security damaging behaviors (SDBs). According to 
Guo (2013) these categories are designed to be distinct from each other, meaning that factors 
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influencing these behaviors may be inherently different and should be studied with this in mind. 
Ideally, organizations want to promote SABs and SCBs while preventing SRBs and SDBs.  
Security Assurance Behaviors 
SABs are behaviors in which an employee has clear intent to help protect an 
organization’s information security (Guo, 2013). SABs are effortful, benevolent actions on the 
part of the employee, and typically involve going above and beyond what is required by the 
organization in order to protect information security. Like Stanton et al’s (2005) aware assurance 
and basic hygiene behaviors, Guo (2013) suggests that employees need a high level of 
technological expertise (e.g. identifying a virus), though it can be argued that there are simpler 
actions, like choosing a strong password and monitoring your computer for signs of a virus, 
which can be performed by any end user. These behaviors may be related to organizational 
citizenship behaviors (Organ, 1988) because they are benevolent in nature and demonstrate a 
desire to help the organization. 
Security Compliance Behaviors 
SCBs are “behaviors that are in line with organizational security policies” (Guo, 2013, p. 
248). While SABs are deliberate behaviors, SCBs may be a result of action or inaction. 
Employees might simply be following information security rules or not engaging in risky or 
damaging behavior. Past research has identified extrinsic and intrinsic motivational factors that 
may influence compliant behaviors, but not personality factors (Padayachee, 2012). Padayachee 
(2012) notes, however, that certain personality traits could contribute to an employee’s sense of 
personal conduct and should be a focus of future research. Antecedents of compliance intention 
include employee past behavior, severity and certainty of punishment, organizational norms and 
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peer behavior, and the extent to which their compliance is effective for organizational 
information security (Herath & Rao, 2009; Vance, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2012). 
Security Risk Behaviors 
SRBs are “behaviors that may put the organization’s information security at risk” and 
involve actions in which employees “do what they are expected not to do” (Guo, 2013, p. 248-
249). Employees engaging in these behaviors might not intend to harm the organization, but 
rather may view these behaviors as convenient for getting their job done (Guo, 2013). 
Regardless, any risk behavior may have negative consequences for the organization. Employees 
with any level of technological expertise can perform these behaviors. Some examples of SRBs 
could include walking away from your computer without locking it first, or writing down a work 
password where others might see it. SRBs are conceptually similar to Stanton et al.’s (2005) 
naïve mistakes and dangerous tinkering behaviors and non-malicious security violations 
(NSMV) as defined by Guo, Yuan, Archer, and Connelly (2011). Guo et al. (2011) showed that 
employee intentions to perform NSMVs are higher if they believe that doing so will improve 
their job performance.   
Security Damaging Behaviors 
SDBs are behaviors that organizations prohibit employees from doing and will cause 
damage to the organization’s information security. These behaviors are generally malicious in 
nature and can result in disciplinary action both by the organization and government. SDBs are 
generally considered to be more severe than SRBs. These behaviors may require a high level of 
technological expertise on the part of the employee and could be considered similar in nature to 
organizationally directed counterproductive work behaviors (Robinson & Bennett, 1995).  
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For the purposes of the present study, Guo’s (2013) taxonomy of cyber-security 
behaviors are used as the basis for scale creation. Using these four categories of behavior as a 
framework, items describing each behavior are tested to determine the underlying factor 
structure of behaviors. This will allow researchers to measure these behaviors and utilize the 
scale for future use in predicting and evaluating these behaviors in the workplace. 
Factor Structure of Cyber Behaviors 
The first goal of this thesis is to determine the nature of cyber-security behaviors. As 
discussed earlier, previous research has classified cyber behaviors along several different 
taxonomies (i.e. Guo, 2013; Lock et al., 1992; Stanton et al., 2005), but little has been done to 
determine the factor structure underlying these behaviors. Although studies in the information 
security context frequently measure behavioral intentions, rather than actual behaviors, it is 
preferable to measure the latter rather than the former. Even though there is a link between 
intentions and behavior, intentions do not always lead to behaviors. This is especially troubling 
because it only takes one risky behavior to put an organization’s information in jeopardy 
(Crossler et al., 2013). For this reason, the current study intends to assess the frequency of cyber-
security behaviors, using a 23-item measure covering security assurance, compliance, risk, and 
damaging behaviors. Because past research in cyber-security focuses primarily on behavioral 
intentions from a single type of security behavior, no single measure adequately covers behaviors 
from all four areas. This thesis will not only determine the structural nature of the data to 
determine if the data fits a four factor model, but also validate a scale aims to provide a 
foundation of measurement for these behaviors.  
Research Question 1: What is the underlying factor structure of cyber-security 
behaviors? 
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Personality 
 For many years, researchers have attempted to define and organize personality traits for 
personnel selection purposes (Barrick & Mount, 1991). Trait theory is arguably the best way to 
study personality (Korzaan & Boswell, 2005; McCrae & Costa, 2012). A widely accepted 
taxonomy of personality is the Five Factor Model, with origins from McDougall (1932), who 
stated, “personality may with advantage be broadly analyzed into five distinguishable but 
inseparable factors, namely, intellect, character, temperament, disposition, and temper” (p.15). 
Norman (1963) later labeled the five factors extraversion, emotional stability, agreeableness, 
contentiousness, and culture based on the work of Fiske (1949), who found that data fit a five 
factor model well. McCrae and Costa (1985, 1987) confirmed this framework of a five factor 
model. Norman’s (1963) five factors are commonly known as the “Big Five”. The Big Five 
factors have been shown to be independent of cognitive ability (McCrae & Costa, 1987). Though 
there has been some debate about the definition about each other factors (Barrick & Mount, 
1991), some common terms used to describe each factor are presented below.  
Extraversion 
Extraversion involves interpersonal tendencies, and is associated with traits such as 
sociability, gregariousness, assertiveness, talkativeness, and activeness (Barrick & Mount, 1991). 
It has also been defined using facets of enthusiasm and assertiveness (DeYoung, 2006; 
DeYoung, Quilty, Peterson, 2007).  
Emotional Stability 
Emotional Stability (Neuroticism) is a generally agreed upon dimension (Barrick & 
Mount, 1991). It involves emotional adjustment, and includes facets such as anxiety, anger, 
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embarrassment, worry, insecurity, vulnerability, impulsiveness, volatility, withdrawal (Barrick & 
Mount, 1991; DeYoung, 2006; DeYoung, Quilty, Peterson, 2007).  
Agreeableness 
Agreeableness also involves interpersonal tendencies, and reflects concern for 
cooperation and social harmony. Facets include; cooperation, compassion, forgiving, modesty, 
lack of hostility, nurturance, politeness, trust, and tolerance (Barrick & Mount, 1991; DeYoung, 
2006; DeYoung, Quilty, Peterson, 2007). This dimension is often associated with prosocial 
elements (Chiaburu, Oh, Berry, Li, & Gardner, 2011). 
Conscientiousness 
Though there is some debate about the label, it has been defined as involving 
dependability, being careful, thorough, responsible, organized, and planful (Barrick & Mount, 
1991), as well as the tendency to be self-disciplined.  
Openness to Experience 
Openness to Experience has also be called Culture (Norman, 1963). Traits associated 
with this factor include imaginative, cultured, curious, original, broad-minded, intelligent, and 
artistically sensitive (Barrick & Mount, 1991).  
Personality and Cyber Behaviors 
Do certain personality traits predict relevant cyber-security behaviors? The second goal 
of this thesis is to determine if personality traits are related to these behaviors. Given that cyber-
security behavior research is a relatively new area of exploration, little has been done to examine 
the relationship between personality variables and different cyber-security related behaviors in 
organizations. While personality is more distal than situational variables, identifying those traits 
that predict cyber behaviors can aid organizations in selecting individuals who will engage in 
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compliance and assurance behaviors, rather than simply relying on training after hire. The 
present study investigates the predictive ability of the Big Five personality dimensions on the 
four types of cyber-security related behaviors as defined by Guo (2013).  
I hypothesize that conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness to experience will be 
valid predictors of security assurance behaviors (SABs). Chiaburu et al. (2011) found that 
conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness to experience are the strongest predictors of 
organizationally directed Organizational Citizenship behaviors, probably due to the prosocial 
nature of the items in the measure. Conscientiousness is expected to be positively related to 
SABs because it involves prosocial characteristics, and conscientious individuals possess the 
desire to protect the organization. Thus, highly conscientious individuals would go the “extra 
step” to ensure that work information is secure. Agreeableness is expected to be positively 
related to SABs. Similar to conscientiousness, agreeableness is related to prosocial 
characteristics and thus may contribute to a desire to help and protect the organization. Lastly, 
openness to experience will predict SABs. Barrick & Mount (1991) found that openness to 
experience is related to training performance, so those high on this trait may be more receptive to 
information security training, and act out those trained behaviors to protect the organization’s 
information security. 
Hypothesis 1a: Conscientiousness will be positively related to security assurance 
behaviors. 
Hypothesis 1b: Conscientiousness will predict security assurance behaviors, such that 
individuals high in conscientiousness will engage in more security assurance behaviors than 
individuals low in conscientiousness. 
Hypothesis 1c: Agreeableness will be positively related to security assurance behaviors. 
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Hypothesis 1d: Agreeableness will predict security assurance behaviors, such that 
individuals high in agreeableness will engage in more security assurance behaviors than 
individuals low in agreeableness. 
Hypothesis 1e: Openness to Experience will be positively related to security assurance 
behaviors. 
Hypothesis 1f: Openness to Experience will predict security assurance behaviors, such 
that individuals high in openness to experience will engage in more security assurance behaviors 
than individuals low in openness to experience. 
Conscientiousness will be related to SCBs, as past research has shown that 
conscientiousness is related to rule-following behavior (Hu et al., 2012). Hu et al. (2012) found 
that dutifulness was positively related to information security compliance intentions, which is a 
facet of conscientiousness. Individuals high in conscientiousness will have a high propensity to 
follow organizational policy, thus engaging in security compliance behaviors. 
Hypothesis 2a: Conscientiousness will be positively related to security compliance 
behaviors. 
Hypothesis 2b: Conscientiousness will predict security compliance behaviors, such that 
individuals high in conscientiousness will engage in more security compliance behaviors than 
individuals low in conscientiousness. 
I hypothesize that conscientiousness will predict security risk behaviors. 
Conscientiousness will be negatively related to risk behaviors, since individuals low in 
conscientiousness will be more willing to engage in risk behaviors because they will be less 
likely to take the consequences of such behaviors into consideration.  
Hypothesis 3a: Conscientiousness will be negatively related to security risk behaviors. 
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Hypothesis 3b: Conscientiousness will predict security risk behaviors, such that 
individuals low in conscientiousness will engage in more security risk behaviors than individuals 
high in conscientiousness. 
 I predict that emotional stability, agreeableness, and conscientiousness will predict 
security damaging behaviors (SDBs). Berry, Ones, and Sackett (2007) found that these three 
traits relate to organizational deviance, and I expect a similar relationship to these traits and 
SDBs, given the nature of these damaging behaviors. Individuals low in emotional stability may 
be volatile and impulsive, increasing the propensity to engage in damaging behaviors. Similarly, 
individuals low in agreeableness and conscientiousness may have a tendency to be hostile and 
lack need for cooperation and self-discipline, making damaging behaviors more likely. 
Hypothesis 4a: Conscientiousness will be negatively related to security damaging 
behaviors. 
Hypothesis 4b: Conscientiousness will predict security damaging behaviors, such that 
individuals low in conscientiousness will engage in more security damaging behaviors than 
individuals high in conscientiousness. 
Hypothesis 4c: Agreeableness will be negatively related to security damaging behaviors. 
Hypothesis 4d: Agreeableness will predict security damaging behaviors, such that 
individuals low in agreeableness will engage in more security damaging behaviors than 
individuals high in agreeableness. 
Hypothesis 4e: Emotional Stability will be negatively related to security damaging 
behaviors. 
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Hypothesis 4f: Emotional Stability will predict security damaging behaviors, such that 
individuals low in emotional stability will engage in more security damaging behaviors than 
individuals high in emotional stability. 
Organizational Citizenship Behaviors 
 Organizational citizenship behaviors, alternatively known as contextual performance, 
(Borman & Motowidlo, 1993) or extra-role behaviors (Van Dyne, Cummings, & Parks, 1995) 
were defined by Organ (1988) as “individual behavior that is discretionary, not directly or 
explicitly recognized by the formal reward system and that in aggregate promotes the effective 
functioning of the organization” (p. 4). This definition has been criticized by more recent 
research because OCBs are often viewed as a requirement by supervisors and related to 
performance evaluations, and thus, reward systems (Organ, 1997; Podsakoff, Whiting, 
Podsakoff, & Blume, 2009).  Smith, Organ, and Near (1983) conceptualized OCBs as altruism 
and compliance behaviors, while Borman and Motowidlo (1993) expanded the criterion domain 
to a five-dimension taxonomy: persisting with enthusiasm, volunteering to carry out non-role 
tasks, helping and cooperating with others, following organizational rules and procedures, and 
endorsing, and supporting, and defending organizational objectives.  
Williams and Anderson (1991) conceptualized a framework that focused on the target 
rather than the context of behavior. This framework defined OCBI as those helpful behaviors 
directed toward other individuals (e.g. helping others who have been absent) and OCBO as those 
behaviors that benefit the organization (e.g. attendance at work is above the norm). While meta-
analysis has brought into question whether the distinction between facets of OCB is meaningful 
(LePine, Erez, & Johnson, 2002), they are measured separately for this thesis, because of the 
conceptual relationships with cyber-security behaviors. 
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OCBs and Cyber Behaviors  
 To the best of my knowledge, past research has not yet investigated the relationship 
between OCBs and cyber-security behaviors. Thus, the third goal of this thesis is to determine if 
cyber behaviors and OCBs are related. By understanding the relationship between citizenship 
behaviors and cyber behaviors, researchers can gain a better understanding about the nature and 
measurement cyber behaviors. Security assurance behaviors are those behaviors taken by an 
employee that actively protect an organization’s information (Guo, 2013). Because these 
behaviors involve a proactive component to help the organization, they are conceptually related 
to organizationally directed OCBs. Similarly, security compliance behaviors will be related to 
organizationally directed OCBs. While security compliance behaviors do not necessarily involve 
behaviors that proactively protect the organization’s information, cyber-security compliance is 
not typically considered part of an employee’s task performance and may be viewed by the 
employee as an action that goes above and beyond their expected job performance. See Figure 1 
for the conceptual model. Thus, I hypothesize the following relationships: 
Hypothesis 5a: Organizationally directed organizational citizenship behaviors will be 
positively related to security assurance behaviors. 
Hypothesis 5b: Organizationally directed organizational citizenship behaviors will be 
positively related to security compliance behaviors. 
Hypothesis 5c: Security assurance and security compliance behaviors will be more 
strongly related to organizationally directed citizenship behaviors than interpersonally directed 
citizenship behaviors. 
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Counterproductive Work Behaviors 
 Counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs) are often defined as employee behaviors that 
are viewed as contrary to the goals of the organization (Sackett & Devore, 2001). Additionally, 
these behaviors have the possibility, but not guarantee of causing harm to the organization, 
which is important because it reflects nature of the behaviors themselves, not outcomes 
(Hoffman & Dilchert, 2012). While some authors define CWBs as intentional behaviors 
(Robinson & Bennett, 1995; Sackett, 2002), others view this idea as problematic, because some 
unintentional employee behaviors are contrary to the legitimate interests of the organization 
(Hoffman & Dilchert, 2012; Motowidlo, 2003). Though there has been some debate about the 
underlying structure of CWBs, Robinson and Bennett’s (1995) conceptual model of CWBs is 
widely used in the literature. Using multidimensional scaling, Robinson and Bennett (1995) 
identified four quadrants of deviant behaviors along two dimensions, severity and target of those 
deviant behaviors. The first quadrant, labeled property deviance, involves serious, 
organizationally directed deviant behaviors. The second quadrant, labeled property deviance, 
involves minor, organizationally directed deviant behaviors. The third quadrant, political 
deviance, involves interpersonally directed but minor deviant behaviors. The last quadrant, 
personal aggression, involved severe, interpersonally directed behaviors.  
Using this work as a basis for scale development, Bennett and Robinson (2000) 
developed and validated a workplace deviance scale with two subscales, organizational deviance 
(OD) and interpersonal deviance (ID).  Organizational deviance is defined as behaviors, which 
employees engage that are targeted towards the organization (e.g. damaging company property, 
sharing confidential company information), while interpersonal deviance is defined as those 
behaviors in which employees perform that are targeted towards other individuals (e.g. gossip, 
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theft from coworkers) (Bennett and Robinson, 2000; Berry, Ones, & Sackett, 2007). 
Confirmatory factor analysis offered support for this two-factor model, and there is evidence for 
both convergent and discriminant validity (Bennett & Robinson, 2000). While there has been 
some criticisms that the high correlation (ρ = .62) between these two factors indicates that they 
are empirically indistinguishable, Berry, et al. (2007) meta-analytically determined that the 
differential relationships between the two factors and the Big Five and OCBs indicated that these 
factors are separate.  
CWBs and Cyber Behaviors 
 Similar to OCBs, no past research has examined the relationships between cyber related 
behaviors and CWBs. Therefore, one of the goals of this thesis is to determine if cyber behaviors 
are similar to certain forms of CWBs. Conceptually, there are several reasons while security risk 
and damaging behaviors will be related to organizational deviance (See Figure 2 for the 
conceptual model). First, both risk and damaging behaviors involve those behaviors that have the 
potential of harming the organization (Guo, 2013). Second, these behaviors can be intentional or 
unintentional, much like traditional definitions of CWBs. Third, security risk and damaging 
behaviors are organizationally, rather than interpersonally directed, because they put an 
organization’s information security at risk, rather than directly harming specific individuals 
(Guo, 2013). Thus I propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 6a: Organizationally directed counterproductive work behaviors will be 
positively related to security risk behaviors. 
Hypothesis 6b: Organizationally directed counterproductive work behaviors will be 
positively related to security damaging behaviors. 
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Hypothesis 6c: Security risk and security damaging behaviors will be more strongly 
related to organizational deviance than interpersonal deviance. 
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Chapter Two 
Method 
 
Participants and Procedure 
Participants were 477 individuals recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk system 
who work in the United States at a variety of organizations and occupations. Participants were 
required to work at least 10 hours per week, work in the United States, and use a computer at 
work. The sample was 52.6% female and an average age of 36 years old (SD = 11.86). 
Participants reported working an average of 38.37 hours (SD = 10.13) per week and using a 
computer an average of 26 hours (SD = 14.35) per week while at work. Additionally, 6.5% of 
participants working in an information technology related job (e.g. systems administrator, 
programmer). 42.8% of participants held a bachelor’s degree, 23.5% had some college, 10.9% 
held an associate’s degree, 9.9% a master’s degree, and 2.7% a professional or doctoral degree.  
Participants who were interested in completing the study posted on Amazon Turk’s 
website received a link to an external Qualtrics survey. They were first asked to read and 
acknowledge an understanding of the consent form, giving consent to participate in the study. 
Next, they completed several demographic questions (e.g. gender, age, job title), frequency of 
computer use at work, a measure of perceptions of penalty severity, the IPIP personality self-
report inventory, the OCB and CWB measures, and the cyber-security behavior inventory. To 
ensure confidentiality, no participant names or personal information were attached to the 
responses. Due to the sensitive nature of the questions and to ensure the most honest responses, 
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participants were assured that this information would be used for research purposes only. 
Participants were compensated $.50 for completing the survey. 
Measures 
Cyber-Security Behaviors 
Cyber-security behaviors were measured using a 23-item scale comprised of self-
developed and items adapted from previous research, based on Guo’s (2013) conceptual model. 
These items measured a wide range of cyber-security behaviors that may be useful in 
understanding the underlying factor structure of cyber-security behaviors. Participants were 
asked to respond to the statement “Please indicate the frequency in which these you have 
engaged in each of the following behaviors in the past year” on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging 
from 1 (never) to 7 (16 or more times). See Appendix A for the complete list of items.  
Big Five Personality 
The Big Five personality factors were measured using the 10-item International 
Personality Item Pool (IPIP) (Goldberg, 1999; Goldberg et al., 2006) scales for emotional 
stability, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. The scale 
will contain a total of 50 items. The scales showed good internal consistency in the current study, 
with α = 0.79 for emotional stability, α = 0.89 for extraversion, α = 0.84 for openness to 
experience, α = 0.87 for agreeableness, and α = 0.84 for conscientiousness.  
Organizational Citizenship Behaviors 
Organizational citizenship behaviors were adapted from Williams and Anderson’s (1991) 
measures of OCBI (7 items) and OCBO (6 items). Both the OCBI and OCBO scales had 
adequate reliability (α = .78 and .69, respectively). Participants were asked to respond to the 
statement “Please indicate the frequency in which these you have engaged in each of the 
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following behaviors in the past year” on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (never) to 5 
(always). 
Counterproductive Work Behaviors 
Counterproductive work behaviors were measured using Bennett and Robinson’s (2000) 
scales measuring interpersonal and organizational deviance. The 7-item interpersonal deviance 
scale showed excellent reliability (α = .91), as did the 12-item organizational deviance scale (α = 
.90). Participants were asked to indicate the frequency, which they have engaged in each 
behavior in the past year on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (never) to 5(always).  
Demographics and Control Variables 
In addition to the above measures, participants were asked to report their age, gender, 
level of education, weekly computer use at work, job tenure, job title, and perceived severity of 
punishment. Perceptions of severity of penalty for breaking organizational security rules were 
measured using 3 items adapted from Herath and Rao (2009). This scale included the questions 
“The organization disciplines employees who break information security rules”, “My 
organization terminates employees who repeatedly break security rules”, and “If I were caught 
violating organization information security policies, I would be severely punished” (Herath and 
Rao, 2009, p. 164), and were measured on a 7-point Likert scale (Strongly Disagree to Strongly 
Agree). The scale had good reliability (α = .88). Because perceptions of severity of penalty could 
affect the frequency of cyber-security behaviors, this data was analyzed with this construct as a 
control. 
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Chapter Three 
Results 
 
Frequency of Cyber-Security Behaviors 
 Means, standard deviations, range, and frequency of all cyber-security scale items are 
presented in Table 3. Because participants reported the frequency in which they performed a 
variety of cyber-security related behaviors, it is interesting to evaluate the extent to which 
employees from a wide variety of occupations are performing not only positive, but also negative 
cyber behaviors. An overwhelming majority of respondents reported using a secure password 
(i.e. a password containing letters, numbers, and symbols) for their work computer (93.1%), 
following information security policies (95.6%) and using good information security practices at 
work, though less than half (43.8%) reported that they change their password more often than 
their employer requires. Most respondents also reported that they monitor their work computer 
for signs of a virus or malware (75.3%) and immediately delete suspicious emails on their work 
email without reading them (79.5%). 75.3% of respondents said they have walked away from 
their computer without locking it first, while about a quarter reported that they have shared their 
work account user name or password with a friend or coworker (24.3%) or written their 
password down and left it where others might see it (28.1%). 35.1% of respondents reported that 
they have copied work information onto a personal USB drive, 21.2% have communicated 
confidential information on an unsecured network, and 12.6% have tried to crack the firework on 
their work computer to access prohibited websites. While it is evident that positive cyber 
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behaviors are more prevalent, it is important to note that a substantial proportion of respondents 
have engaged in risky or potentially damaging cyber behaviors in the past year.  
Cyber-Security Scale Dimensions 
In order to answer research question 1, factor analysis was used evaluate the dimensions 
of cyber security behaviors using a 23-item scale. Because no prior research has looked at a full 
range of behaviors within one scale, exploratory factor analysis was used to first determine the 
most likely factor structure, followed by confirmatory factor analysis to validate the results from 
the EFA. In order to conduct the EFA, I randomly selected approximately half of the responses 
from the overall sample, resulting in a sample of 238 participants. EFA operates under the 
common factor model, which assumes that each measured variable had common and unique 
variance, and that underlying common factors can explain the correlations among measured 
variables.  
Two commonly used extraction algorithm for EFA are maximum likelihood (ML) and 
principal axis factoring (PAF). Each method estimates parameters according to assumptions of 
the common factor model, but differ in how those parameters are estimated (Fabrigar & 
Wegener, 2012). Both ML and PAF are iterative techniques, meaning that they repeat until the 
communalities between two different iterations are very similar, however solutions need to be 
rotated for interpretability (Fabrigar & Wegener, 2012). ML assumes that the data are based on a 
random sample and that the measured variables have a multivariate normal distribution (Fabrigar 
& Wegener, 2012). The goal of ML is to estimate the factor loadings and unique variances as to 
maximize the likelihood function. Unlike PAF, ML provides a likelihood ratio test (χ2) statistic 
as an indicator of model fit, though it is highly sensitive to sample size. While ML provides 
additional information about fit and performs slightly better than PAF when factors are 
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correlated and there are unequal loadings within factors (de Winter & Dodou, 2012), it tends to 
over factor solutions. Additionally, PAF is typically good at recovering factors with low loadings 
(de Winter & Dodou, 2012). 
While in general both ML and PAF are reasonable extraction techniques for EFA, PAF 
provides a more robust solution in circumstances where the observed variables are non-normal 
(Fabrigar et al., 1999). Evaluation of items on the cyber-security scale indicated that some items 
intended to measure security damaging behaviors were significantly positively skewed, and had 
significant kurtosis. The non-normality of these types of behaviors is not unexpected however, 
given the infrequency of some of the more extreme cyber damaging behaviors. Because of the 
moderate violation of non-normality, ML is inappropriate to use as an extraction technique. 
Therefore PAF was used as the factor identification and extraction technique for EFA. 
 Because the factors of cyber-security behaviors are likely correlated, oblique rotation was 
used in the analysis. One of the most commonly used oblique rotation methods is promax 
rotation, which transforms the initial solution by raising factor loadings to a power of two or 
more (Fabrigar & Wegener, 2012). Factor loadings are raised by the kappa parameter, and higher 
values produce bigger correlations between factors (Fabrigar & Wegener, 2012). Given the 
sufficiency of results produced by promax, this rotation method was used. 
 The initial factor analysis with promax with Kaiser Normalization extracted five factors 
that were shown on the scree plot, and had an eigenvalue greater than one. Items with factor 
loadings lower than .4 were used as a cutoff. Though a fifth factor was extracted during the 
factor analysis, no items loaded strongly onto this factor. Therefore, in order to extract a more 
parsimonious solution, the EFA was rerun with a maximum of 4 factors extracted. This four 
factor solution converged after 7 iterations and items with factor loadings lower than .4 were 
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deleted. Items “Immediately deleted suspicious emails in your work email without reading them” 
and “Refused to tell anyone your work ID or password” were heavily cross loaded on factors 2 
and 4, and were subsequently deleted from the scale. The factor analysis was rerun on the 
remaining 21 items to obtain a final 4-factor solution, which is readily interpretable. In this 
solution, each item loaded strongly onto one factor. Together, the four factors accounted for 
57.8% of the variance. Item factor loadings and factors are presented in Table 4. For the 
purposes of this paper and to be consistent with proposed hypotheses, the final four factors 
extracted were labeled security assurance behaviors (SABs), security compliance behaviors 
(SCBs), security risk behaviors (SRBs), and security damaging behaviors (SDBs). 
 Security damaging behaviors accounted for the most variance (31.4%) and therefore 
appeared to be most important for the scale, perhaps in part because this dimension contained the 
most items. This dimension is comprised of items SDB 1-6, as well as SRB4, SRB5, and SRB6. 
This dimension seems to encompass not only some of the more severe behaviors, but also some 
risk behaviors such as copying work information on a personal USB drive, installing 
unauthorized software from the internet onto your computer, and using your social security 
number as your password. The security compliance behaviors dimension accounted for second 
most variance (13.1%), and is comprised of items SCB 1-4, as well as SAB4 (using a secure 
password for your work computer). While SAB4 was originally intended to measure an 
assurance behavior, it is not unreasonable for this to be considered a security compliance 
behavior, given that many companies require employees to use strong passwords for their user 
accounts. The third dimension, security risk behaviors, accounted for 7.78% of the variance, and 
was comprised of SRB1, SRB2, SRB3, and SRB7. These items all involved behaviors about 
computer passwords, so it makes theoretical sense that these items loaded together. The last 
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dimension, security assurance behaviors, accounted for 5.61% of the variance and is comprised 
of items SAB1, SAB5, and SAB6, which measured the frequency in which people monitor their 
work computer for signs of a virus/malware, changed their password frequency, or went above 
and beyond what their organization required to protect their work information. 
Scale Validation  
 In order to validate the factor structure of the cyber-security scale, confirmatory factor 
analysis was conducted on the second half of the data (N = 239) not used in the exploratory 
factor analysis. As with EFA, one of the most common estimation methods is maximum 
likelihood, which assumes normality in the data. Because there is evidence of non-normality in 
the data, I used an alternative estimation method, MLR, which has standard errors robust to non-
normality and an adjusted chi-square statistic that uses a scaling factor to correct for the degree 
of non-normality (Satorra & Bentler, 1994). A four-factor model based on the results of the 
exploratory factor analysis was fit to the data using Mplus. A marker variable strategy, in which 
the first item on each latent factor is fixed to 1.00, was used for model identification purposes.  
In order to determine if the model fit the data, overall fit indices, factor loadings, and 
residual correlations were considered. When examining overall fit indices, a non-significant chi-
square test indicates any differences between the observed and model-implied covariance 
matrices may be due to sampling error and it can be argued that the model is plausible. 
Standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR), root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA), comparative fit index (CFI), and Tucker-Lewis (TLI) were evaluated for overall fit. 
According to the recommendations of Hu and Bentler (1999), smaller SRMR values indicate 
better fit and values less than .08 indicate adequate fit and RMSEA values less than .06 are 
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considered good fit. CFI and TLI both index the discrepancy between the tested model and null 
model, and values greater than .95 indicate good fit.  
For this model, the Satorra-Bentler chi-square test was significant (χ2 = 346.815, p <.001) 
however this fit measure is highly sensitive to sample size and other fit indices should be 
considered. CFI and TLI were .86 and .84 respectively, which indicated adequate fit. RMSEA 
was .06 and SRMR was .07, also indicating good fit. Additionally, standardized factor loadings 
were adequate (most over .6) with the exception of one item, “walked away from your computer 
without locking it first”, which had a non-significant loading (.177) on the SRB factor. Because 
the model did not explain significant variance in that item and in consideration of parsimony in 
the scale, the item was removed and the subsequent factor model was fit to the data. Removal of 
that item resulted in an improvement in global model fit indices. While the Satorra-Bentler chi-
square test statistic was still significant (χ2 = 290.99, p <.001), other measures of fit improved 
(CFI = .89, TLI = .87, RMSEA=.057), standardized factor loadings ranged from .40-.89 (See 
Table 5). Because the models were non-nested, I could not conduct a scaled chi-square 
difference test, however with the consideration of theory and parsimony in the scale, the model 
without SRB7 is preferred in this case. See Table 6 for global fit indices of both models. 
In order to compute scale reliability for each cyber-security subscale, I used composite 
reliability rather than Cronbach’s alpha. Because loading values are unequal within each scale, 
composite reliability is preferred over alpha because alpha tends to underestimate reliability 
(Raykov, 1997). The reliabilities were .63, .75, .63, and .89 for SAB, SCB, SRB, and SDB 
dimensions, respectively. The low reliability for the SAB and SRB scales may be due to the 
heterogeneity and low number of items in each scale. Interfactor correlations suggested that the 
factors are related, but unique. The SAB dimension is significantly related to SCB and SDB (.44 
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and .13, respectively), but not to SRB (.043, p = .62). SCB was significantly negatively related to 
SRB (-.35, p<.01) and SDB (-.33, p<.01). SRB and SDB were significant positively related (.75, 
p<.001). Thus, for the purposes of hypothesis testing, the final cyber-security scales contained 3, 
5, 3, and 9 items measuring SABs, SCBs, SRBs, and SDBs, respectively.  
Hypothesis Testing 
For all further analyses, the entire sample was used (N = 477). Means, standard 
deviations, skewness, and kurtosis values for all study variables are presented in Table 7. As 
previously discussed, cyber-security behaviors, organizational citizenship and counterproductive 
work behaviors were measured on 7 and 5-point Likert scales, respectively, with “1” indicating 
that respondents had not performed that behavior in the past year. Personality was measured on a 
5-point Likert scale of accuracy, with “3” indicating that a given personality item was neither 
inaccurate nor accurate in describing the respondent. Overall, respondents performed more 
individually directed (M = 3.65, SD = .67) and organizationally directed (M = 4.08, SD = .58) 
organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) than individually directed (M = 1.47, SD = .66) and 
organizationally directed (M = 1.64, SD = .61) counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs). 
Similarly, they performed more SABs (M = 3.48, SD = 1.50) and SCBs (M = 5.48, SD = 1.39) 
than SRBs (M = 1.95, SD = 1.18) and SDBs (M = 1.46, SD = .81).  
Next, correlational analyses were conducted to test select hypotheses. See Table 8 for 
zero-order correlations between all variables. Reliabilities are reported on the diagonal, and are 
coefficient alpha for all scales, except for the cyber-security dimensions, which are composite 
reliability. Security assurance behaviors were positively related to conscientiousness (r = .18, p 
<.001), agreeableness (r = .15, p <.001), openness to experience (r = .11, p <.05), supporting 
Hypotheses 1a, 1c, and 1e. Though not hypothesized, emotional stability was also positively 
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related to SABs (r = .19, p <.001). It should be noted that due to the low reliability of this scale, 
however, relationships could be attenuated. Conscientiousness was positively related to security 
compliance behaviors (r = .27, p <.001), supporting Hypothesis 2a. Additionally, agreeableness 
(r = .29, p <.001), openness to experience (r = .27, p <.001), and emotional stability (r = .21, p 
<.001) were positively related to SCBs. Conscientiousness was negatively related to security risk 
behaviors (r = -.21, p <.001), supporting hypothesis 3a. Agreeableness (r = -.14, p <.01), 
openness to experience (r = -.16, p <.001), and emotional stability (r = -.18, p <.001) were also 
negatively related to SRBs. Lastly, conscientiousness (r = -.32, p <.001), agreeableness (r = -.29, 
p <.001), and emotional stability (r = -.11, p <.05), were negatively related to security damaging 
behaviors supporting hypotheses 4a, 4c, and 4e.  
Additional correlational analyses were conducted to determine if cyber-security 
behaviors were related to two types of organizational citizenship and counterproductive work 
behaviors. SABs were significantly, positively related to both individually directed (r = .18, p 
<.001) and organizationally directed (r = .15, p <.01) OCBs, which supports hypothesis 5a. 
Additionally, SCBs were significantly, positively related to both individually directed (r = .22, p 
<.001) and organizationally directed (r = .44, p <.001) OCBs, which supporting hypothesis 5b. 
Conversely, organizationally directed OCBs are strongly, negatively related both SRBs (r = -.40, 
p <.001) and SDBs (r = -.55, p <.001). Therefore, it appears that individuals who are engaging in 
beneficial behaviors towards their organization are complying with or going above and beyond 
organizational policy but are engaging in fewer risky or damaging cyber behaviors. SRBs were 
significantly positively related to interpersonal deviance (r = .43, p <.001) and organizational 
deviance (r = .48, p <.001), supporting hypothesis 6a. SDBs were also significantly positively 
related to interpersonal deviance (r = .61, p <.001) and organizational deviance (r = .61, p 
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<.001), supporting hypothesis 6b. These results suggest that individuals who are engaging in 
counterproductive work behaviors are also engaging in cyber-security risk and damaging 
behaviors. 
Post hoc t-tests were conducted with Steiger’s (1980) equation for dependent correlations 
to test hypotheses 5c and 6c and examine if the correlations previously mentioned are 
significantly different from each other.  Hypothesis 5c stated that SABs and SCBs would be 
more strongly related to OCBs than interpersonally directed OCBs. Post hoc analysis revealed 
that the correlation between SABs and individually directed OCBs is not significantly different 
from the correlation between SABs and organizationally directed OCBs (t = .65, p =.52). 
However, the correlation between SCBs and organizationally directed OCBs was significantly 
higher than the correlation between SCBs and individually directed OCBs (t = -4.68, p 
<.001).Thus, hypothesis 5c was partially supported. Hypothesis 6c stated that SRBs and SDBs 
would be more strongly related to organizational deviance than interpersonal deviance. There 
were no significant differences in the relationships between SRBs and both types of deviance (t 
= -1.81, p =.07). Similarly, there were no significant differences between SDBs and both types 
of deviance (t = .14, p =.89). Therefore, hypothesis 6c was not supported.  
 A series of hierarchical linear regressions analyses were performed to test the remaining 
hypotheses. Upon further examination of the correlation table, it is important to note that age, 
gender, frequency of computer use, and severity of punishment were significantly related to at 
least one type of cyber behavior. Therefore, those variables were entered into the subsequent 
regression equations in step 1 as controls. See Tables 9-12 for individual regression results. In 
order to test hypothesis 1b, conscientiousness was entered into the regression equation in step 2 
for predicting SABs. Regression results indicated that conscientiousness was predictive of SABs 
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(β =.15, p <.01), even when controlling for demographics and severity of punishment, which was 
also a significant predictor (β =.18, p <.001). Thus, hypothesis 1b was supported. Agreeableness 
(β =.14, p <.01) and Openness to Experience (β =.10, p <.05) were also significantly, positively 
predictive of SABs, supporting hypotheses 1d and 1f. These results suggest that individuals with 
higher levels of conscientiousness, agreeableness, or openness to experience may be more likely 
to engage in cyber assurance behaviors. Conscientiousness was a significant predictor of SCBs 
(β =.19, p <.001), meaning that higher levels of conscientiousness are predictive of more 
compliant behavior. This supports hypothesis 2b. Additionally, older individuals (β =.17, p 
<.001), those who spend more time on the computer (β =.13, p <.01) and those who perceive that 
they will be punished for breaking information security rules (β =.15, p <.01) are also more 
likely to engage in compliant behavior.  
Conscientiousness was significantly, negatively predictive of SRBs (β =-.18, p <.001), 
suggesting that individuals lower in conscientiousness are more likely to engage in risky cyber 
behavior (hypothesis 3b – supported). Additionally, those who perceive higher severity of 
punishment are less likely to engage in these behaviors (β =-.10, p <.01). Lastly, 
conscientiousness (β =-.25, p <.001) and agreeableness (β =-.19, p <.001) were both individually 
predictive of SDBs, such that individuals lower on these traits were more likely to engage in 
damaging behaviors. These results support hypotheses 4b and 4d. Emotional stability, however, 
was not a significant predictor of SDBs (β =-.08, p =.09), so hypothesis 4f was not supported. 
Additionally, younger (β =.18, p <.001), male (β =.18, p <.001) participants were more likely to 
engage in SDBs at work.  
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Additional Analyses 
 Additional hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to determine if hypothesized 
personality traits were incrementally predictive of cyber-security behaviors beyond other Big 
Five traits. Results showed that conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness to experience did 
not predict SABs above and beyond other Big Five traits. Similarly conscientiousness was not 
significantly incrementally predictive of SCBs or SRBs over the other four Big Five traits. 
However, conscientiousness had significant incremental validity in predicting SDBs over the 
other Big Five traits (β =-.20, p <.001), as did agreeableness (β =-.13, p <.05). This indicates that 
these personality traits may be especially helpful in predicting individuals who will engage in 
more severe cyber-security behaviors.  
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Chapter Four 
Discussion 
 
 The first goal and research question of this thesis was to explore the dimensionality of 
Guo’s (2013) recent conceptualization of cyber-security behaviors. Using the existing literature, 
a scale was constructed using items measuring each dimension of this framework. The scale 
consisted of a wide variety of cyber-security related behaviors, ranging from positive, proactive 
behaviors (e.g. checking your computer for signs of a virus) to more malicious behaviors (e.g. 
cracking the firewall on a company computer). Respondents reported engaging in positive and 
compliant behaviors more often than risky and damaging, which is good news for organizations. 
However, the fact that employees are engaging negative behaviors should be of concern to 
organizations, because even one occurrence of a risky cyber related behavior by an employee can 
lead to damaging consequences for an organization (Crossler et al., 2013). For example, 28.1% 
of participants reported that they had written down their work password where others might see 
it. While this behavior itself does not cause immediate damage to an organization’s information, 
someone with malicious intent could see that password and use it to gain unauthorized access to 
that information.   
 Factor analysis revealed that there are four factors underlying the items of the new cyber-
security scale, which is consistent with the framework suggested by Guo (2013). These factors 
are labeled security assurance behaviors, security compliance behaviors, security risk behaviors, 
and security damaging behaviors. Most items load onto their respective factors, with the 
exception of the security damaging behaviors dimension. Because some items that were 
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originally intended to measure a “risk” behavior, not “damaging” behavior, load on the same 
factor as some of the more extreme behaviors, there could be some other underlying 
commonality about the behaviors beyond the properties suggested by Guo (2013). Given that all 
of the items in this dimension seem to get at behaviors that are counterproductive to an 
organization’s information security, that dimension might be best labeled as “counterproductive 
cyber behavior” for use in future research.  
Correlation and regression analyses reveals that several Big Five personality traits are 
significantly related to, and predictive of, cyber-security behaviors. Conscientiousness, 
agreeableness, and openness to experience are all significantly positively correlated with and 
predictive of security assurance behaviors. This means that individuals higher on these traits are 
more likely to go above and beyond what is expected to protect their organization’s information 
security. These findings are consistent with Chiaburu et al. (2011), who found that these three 
traits are the strongest predictors of prosocial behavior at work. Additionally, individuals high in 
openness might be more receptive to any information security training they may have received, 
which often encourages employees to proactively protect their work information.  
 Consistent with past research on cyber-security rule following behavior (Hu et al., 2012), 
conscientiousness is significant related to, and predictive of, security compliance behaviors. 
Individuals high in conscientiousness are aware of and may want to follow the rules of their 
organization; therefore, they adhere to the information security policies put in place by their 
organization. Additionally, agreeableness, openness to experience, and emotional stability are 
positively related to complaint behavior. Similar to security assurance behaviors, those high in 
agreeableness and openness may be more receptive for security training, while those high in 
emotional stability have more self-discipline and therefore may be more likely to follow 
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compliant procedures rather than risky behavior. Additionally, an interesting, but perhaps not 
surprising finding is that individuals who perceive that they will be punished for breaking the 
rules are more likely to engage in compliant behavior. Theoretically, if an individual feels like 
they will get in trouble for breaking the rules, they will be less likely to break those rules.  
 Conscientiousness is significantly negatively related to, and predictive of, security risk 
behaviors, a dimension that is comprised of items specifically involving risky password 
behaviors. Individuals who are lower in conscientiousness might not consider the consequences 
of actions such as leaving a password where others might see it or sharing that information with 
coworkers or friends. Agreeableness, openness to experience, and emotional stability are also 
negatively related to risk behaviors. These findings contradict those by Whitty, Doodson, Creese, 
and Hodges (2015), who found that individuals higher on openness to experience were more 
likely to share their password with others. Individuals who perceived a higher severity of 
punishment are less likely to engage in risky behaviors, possibly because the consequences were 
too high if they were to get caught.  
 As hypothesized, conscientiousness, agreeableness, and emotional stability are negatively 
related to security damaging behaviors. While regression analyses reveals that conscientiousness 
and agreeableness are predictive of security damaging behaviors, emotional stability did not 
predict these behaviors when controlling for age, sex, computer use, and severity of punishment. 
This finding is consistent with Berry et al., (2007) who found that these traits are related to 
deviant behavior. Individuals low in conscientiousness and agreeableness may not take 
consequences of their actions in to consideration, or may even maliciously act against their 
organization if it is beneficial to them. Consistent with prior literature (Whitty et al., 2015), 
younger individuals were more likely to engage in security damaging behaviors, perhaps because 
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they are more comfortable with technology than older individuals and possess the knowledge to 
engage in the behaviors measured by this dimension that require more technological expertise.  
 Positive cyber behaviors (security assurance and compliance behaviors) are both 
positively related to individually directed and interpersonally directed organizational citizenship 
behaviors. Employees who go above and beyond their task performance are also likely to engage 
in proactive and compliant cyber behaviors, because they likely have a desire to help their 
organization. Even though compliant cyber behaviors do not necessarily have a proactive 
component from an information security perspective, employees may view them as going above 
and beyond what is required of them because cyber related behaviors are often not considered an 
inherent part of their task performance. Follow-up analyses indicated that security compliance 
behaviors are more strongly related to organizationally-directed organizational citizenship 
behaviors than individually directed organizational citizenship behaviors, possibly because 
complying with organizational cyber policy is a similar behavior to engaging in other behaviors 
that help the organization, rather than coworkers.  
 Results also indicated that security risk behaviors and security damaging behaviors are 
strongly, positively related to both interpersonal and organizational deviance. Given that 
organizational citizenship behaviors are positively related to positive cyber behaviors, it makes 
sense that counterproductive work behaviors are related to negative cyber behaviors. Individuals 
who engage in undesirable behaviors toward their coworkers and organization are also engaging 
in behaviors that could put their organization’s information at risk. Additionally, security risk 
behaviors and security damaging behaviors are strongly, negatively related to organizationally 
directed organizational citizenship behaviors. Overall, these findings indicate that individuals 
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who are engaging in behaviors to help their organizational are not necessary the same individuals 
who are engaging in risky or damaging cyber behaviors.  
Implications 
 Overall, there are a number of interesting findings of this study. First, cyber behaviors 
can potentially be grouped in four distinct dimensions. Second, that while a perhaps more distal 
than constructs such as organizational norms or attitudes, personality traits are related to and 
predict cyber behaviors. This suggests that organizations may be able to use traditional 
personality screening and selection measures to identify employees who may be more likely to 
engage in cyber behaviors of interest. Managers should be mindful of the heterogeneity of 
personalities of their employees and tailor cyber training programs and workshops accordingly. 
Selection, in addition to training for cyber awareness, can also potentially reduce the frequency 
of cyber risk behaviors by employees. Third, the finding that OCBs relate positively to SABs and 
SCBs, and negatively to SRBs and SDBs suggest that same types of people who are helping the 
organization are also not harming it. Therefore, by hiring and retaining employees who are 
frequently engaging in OCBs and other positive behaviors, an organization may be able to more 
easily foster a culture where positive cyber behaviors are also the norm.  
Given the finding that perceptions of severity of punishment were predictive of reduced 
SRBs and SDBs, organizations should make it clear to employees that risky and damaging 
behaviors will not be tolerated and that consequences are just as severe as breaking other 
organizational rules. Additionally, companies should make their policies transparent to 
employees, so that there is little ambiguity about what constitutes a negative cyber behavior. 
These practices, along with careful selection of employees, can potentially help reduce the risk of 
insider threat.  
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Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
While this research contributes to the rapidly growing body of cyber-security literature, it 
has several limitations. First, the reliability of the SAB and SRB factors is low, which may have 
attenuated the relationships between these dimensions and other study variables. Further, the 
behaviors in this scale were not inclusive of all cyber-related behavior, but rather a sampling of 
behaviors, especially given that technology keeps evolving. New threats mean new opportunities 
for information leaks in organizations, and the opportunities for employees to engage in risky or 
damaging behaviors only grow. Future research could consider additional threats such as 
phishing scams to identify other ways that employees might potentially put organizational 
information security at risk.  
Because of the cross sectional nature of this study, it is difficult to prove that personality 
is causing employees to engage in certain behaviors. Though it is unlikely that cyber behaviors 
shape an employee’s personality, it is impossible to say with certainty that there is no 
bidirectional relationship. Additionally, because all measures were self-report, participants could 
have been inaccurate or misleading about how frequently they engaged in various behaviors. For 
example, an employee reporting that they frequently engage in positive cyber behaviors might 
believe they are complying with information security policy, but by company standards they are 
not. Lastly, this study did not capture the opportunity to perform each behavior. Two employees 
within different organizations may both have similar intentions to engage in a risky behavior, but 
only one might actually perform that behavior if the opportunity arises. It may be fruitful for 
future research to investigate role of opportunity in the link between intention and behavior. 
Given these findings, future research should also investigate the interaction between 
personality and situation within a given organization, and its influence on employee cyber 
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behaviors. Combining these distal and more proximal factors may give a more complete picture 
of why employees engage in these behaviors. For example, individuals low in conscientiousness 
may be more likely to engage in risky behavior only when there are ambiguous rules surrounding 
that behavior, whereas those high in conscientiousness might be less likely to break the rules 
regardless of rule ambiguity.  
Conclusion 
 The current study sought to investigate the previously understudied relationships between 
cyber-security behaviors, personality, and organizational and counterproductive work behaviors. 
Unlike past research, it evaluated the prevalence and antecedents of actual cyber-security 
behaviors, rather than attitudes or intentions. Results demonstrate that cyber-security related 
behavior can be separated into four distinct categories and that personality traits such as 
conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness to experience are predictive of the spectrum of 
cyber behavior. Further, cyber-related behaviors are related organizational and counterproductive 
work behaviors. This research suggests that personality is a useful predictor for cyber-security 
behaviors and can potentially be used to mitigate insider threat in the workplace.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Summary of Current Security Behavior Taxonomies 
 
Reference Focus 
Categories of 
Behavior 
Dimensions Range of Behavior 
Loch, Carr, 
and 
Warkentin 
(1992) 
Threats None Source 
Perpetrator 
Intention 
Consequences 
Internal – External  
Human or Non-Human 
Intentional or Accidental 
Disclosure of information – Denial 
of Service 
Im and 
Baskerville 
(2005) 
Threats None Intention 
Mode 
Motive 
Deliberate or Accidental 
Physical-Virtual  
Fraud, Espionage, Vandalism 
Stanton, 
Stam, 
Mastrangelo, 
and Jolton 
(2005) 
End User 
Security 
Behaviors  
Intentional 
destruction 
Detrimental 
misuse 
Dangerous 
tinkering Naïve 
mistakes 
Aware 
assurance Basic 
hygiene 
User expertise 
User 
intentions 
Little expertise – expert knowledge 
Benevolent – Malicious  
Guo (2013) Employee 
(end user 
and IS) 
security-
related 
behaviors 
Security 
assurance 
Security 
compliant 
Security risk-
taking 
Security 
damaging 
Intentionality 
Motive 
Expertise 
Role 
Job 
relatedness 
Consequence 
Action 
Rule 
Intentional or Unintentional 
Beneficial – Malicious 
Low – High 
End Users or IS People 
N/A 
 
Improve Security – Damage 
Action or Inaction 
Organizational Policy or Law 
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Table 2. Research Question and Hypothesized Relationships 
 
Cyber-
Security 
Behaviors 
Research 
Question 1 
What is the underlying factor structure of cyber-security 
behaviors? 
Security 
Assurance 
Behaviors 
Hypothesis 
1a 
Conscientiousness will be positively related to security 
assurance behaviors. 
Hypothesis 
1b 
Conscientiousness will predict security assurance behaviors, 
such that individuals high in conscientiousness will engage in 
more security assurance behaviors than individuals low in 
conscientiousness. 
Hypothesis 
1c 
Agreeableness will be positively related to security assurance 
behaviors. 
Hypothesis 
1d 
Agreeableness will predict security assurance behaviors, such 
that individuals high in agreeableness will engage in more 
security assurance behaviors than individuals low in 
agreeableness. 
Hypothesis 
1e 
Openness to Experience will be positively related to security 
assurance behaviors. 
Hypothesis 
1f 
Openness to Experience will predict security assurance 
behaviors, such that individuals high in openness to 
experience will engage in more security assurance behaviors 
than individuals low in openness to experience. 
Security 
Compliance 
Behaviors 
Hypothesis 
2a 
Conscientiousness will be positively related to security 
compliance behaviors. 
Hypothesis 
2b 
Conscientiousness will predict security compliance 
behaviors, such that individuals high in conscientiousness 
will engage in more security compliance behaviors than 
individuals low in conscientiousness. 
Security 
Risk 
Behaviors 
Hypothesis 
3a 
Conscientiousness will be negatively related to security risk 
behaviors. 
Hypothesis 
3b 
Conscientiousness will predict security risk behaviors, such 
that individuals low in conscientiousness will engage in more 
security risk behaviors than individuals high in 
conscientiousness. 
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Table 2, continued. Research Question and Hypothesized Relationships  
 
Security 
Damaging 
Behaviors 
Hypothesis 4a 
Conscientiousness will be negatively related to security 
damaging behaviors. 
Hypothesis 4b 
Conscientiousness will predict security damaging behaviors, 
such that individuals low in conscientiousness will engage in 
more security damaging behaviors than individuals high in 
conscientiousness. 
Hypothesis 4c 
Agreeableness will be negatively related to security damaging 
behaviors. 
Hypothesis 4d 
Agreeableness will predict security damaging behaviors, such 
that individuals low in agreeableness will engage in more 
security damaging behaviors than individuals high in 
agreeableness. 
Hypothesis 4e 
Emotional Stability will be negatively related to security 
damaging behaviors. 
Hypothesis 4f 
Emotional Stability will predict security damaging behaviors, 
such that individuals low in emotional stability will engage in 
more security damaging behaviors than individuals high in 
emotional stability. 
Organizational 
Citizenship 
Behaviors 
Hypothesis 5a 
Organizationally directed organizational citizenship behaviors 
will be positively related to security assurance behaviors. 
Hypothesis 5b 
Organizationally directed organizational citizenship behaviors 
will be positively related to security compliance behaviors. 
Hypothesis 5c 
Security assurance and security compliance behaviors will be 
more strongly related to organizationally directed citizenship 
behaviors than interpersonally directed citizenship behaviors. 
Counterproduc
tive Work 
Behaviors 
Hypothesis 6a 
Organizationally directed counterproductive work behaviors 
will be positively related to security risk behaviors. 
Hypothesis 6b 
Organizationally directed counterproductive work behaviors 
will be positively related to security damaging behaviors. 
Hypothesis 6c 
Security risk and security damaging behaviors will be more 
strongly related to organizational deviance than interpersonal 
deviance. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Cyber-Security Scale Items 
 
 
Item Mean SD Min Max
% Who 
Performed 
Behavior 
SAB1 Monitored your work computer for signs of a virus or malware 4.20 2.323 1 7 75.3%
SAB2
Immediately deleted suspicious emails in your work email without 
reading them
4.47 2.289 1 7 79.5%
SAB3 Refused to tell anyone your work ID or password 3.77 2.391 1 7 70.2%
SAB4
Used a secure password for your work computer. (i.e. a password 
containing a combination of letters, numbers, and symbols)
5.52 1.943 1 7 93.1%
SAB5
Changed your password more frequently than your employer 
requires.
2.29 1.760 1 7 43.8%
SAB6
Went above and beyond what is required of you in order to protect 
your work information.
3.96 2.190 1 7 76.1%
SCB1 Followed the information security policies and practices at work 6.00 1.649 1 7 95.6%
SCB2 Used the information security technology provided to you at work. 4.90 2.315 1 7 81.8%
SCB3 Used good information security practices at work. 5.81 1.758 1 7 94.8%
SCB4
Complied with organizational information security policies to 
protect the organization's information systems.
5.17 2.282 1 7 83.9%
SRB1
Written your work password on a piece of paper and left it where 
others might see it.
1.79 1.482 1 7 28.1%
SRB2 Chosen relatively simple passwords for your work computer. 2.43 1.817 1 7 50.1%
SRB3
Shared your work account user name or password with a friend or 
coworker.
1.64 1.352 1 7 24.3%
SRB4 Used your social security number as your password. 1.28 .954 1 7 10.3%
SRB5
Copied work information onto a personal USB drive to do work at 
home.
2.12 1.771 1 7 35.1%
SRB6
Installed unauthorized software from the internet onto your work 
computer without permission from your employer.
1.59 1.241 1 7 23.9%
SRB7 Walked away from your computer without locking it first. 1.33 .977 1 7 75.3%
SDB1
Attempted to crack the password on the firewall your company has 
set in place to assess prohibited websites while at work.
1.25 .846 1 7 12.6%
SDB2 Introduced a Trojan horse program into your company’s network. 1.36 1.082 1 7 9.6%
SDB3
Used a file decryption program to discover the contents of a file 
containing information you are not authorized to see.
1.33 1.006 1 7 12.6%
SDB4 Used you company email to send spam messages for personal gain. 1.62 1.335 1 7 11.7%
SDB5 Communicated confidential information on an unsecured network. 4.09 2.336 1 7 21.2%
SDB6
Intentionally disclosed confidential company information to 
unauthorized sources. 
1.27 .848 1 6 11.0%
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Table 4. Exploratory Factor Analysis Loadings 
 
  
1 2 3 4
Security Assurance Behaviors
Monitored your work computer for signs of a virus or malware 0.486
Changed your password more frequently than your employer 
requires. 0.402
Went above and beyond what is required of you in order to 
protect your work information. 0.512
Security Compliance Behaviors
Used a secure password for your work computer. (i.e. a 
password containing a combination of letters, numbers, and 
symbols) 0.679
Followed the information security policies and practices at 
work 0.727
Used the information security technology provided to you at 
work. 0.536
Used good information security practices at work. 0.738
Complied with organizational information security policies to 
protect the organization's information systems. 0.608
Security Risk Behaviors
Written your work password on a piece of paper and left it 
where others might see it. 0.402
Chosen relatively simple passwords for your work computer.
0.668
Shared your work account user name or password with a friend 
or coworker. 0.452
Walked away from your computer without locking it first. 0.453
Security Damaging Behaviors
Used your social security number as your password. 0.895
Copied work information onto a personal USB drive to do 
work at home. 0.414
Installed unauthorized software from the internet onto your 
work computer without permission from your employer. 0.615
Attempted to crack the password on the firewall your company 
has set in place to assess prohibited websites while at work.
0.845
Introduced a Trojan horse program into your company’s 
network. 0.868
Used a file decryption program to discover the contents of a 
file containing information you are not authorized to see. 0.805
Used you company email to send spam messages for personal 
gain. 0.814
Communicated confidential information on an unsecured 
network. 0.494
Intentionally disclosed confidential company information to 
unauthorized sources. 0.825
Factors
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Table 5. Confirmatory Factor Analysis Loadings 
 
 
Notes: *Item removed from final scale. CR = Composite Reliability
Factor and Item Loading CR
Security Assurance Behaviors 0.63
Monitored your work computer for signs of a virus or malware. 0.53
Changed your password more frequently than your employer requires. 0.40
Went above and beyond what is required of you in order to protect your 
work information.
0.66
Security Compliance Behaviors 0.75
Used a secure password for your work computer. (i.e. a password 
containing a combination of letters, numbers, and symbols)
0.50
Followed the information security policies and practices at work. 0.71
Used the information security technology provided to you at work. 0.53
Used good information security practices at work. 0.65
Complied with organizational information security policies to protect the 
organization's information systems.
0.63
Security Risk Behaviors 0.63
Written your work password on a piece of paper and left it where others 
might see it.
0.60
Chosen relatively simple passwords for your work computer. 0.46
Shared your work account user name or password with a friend or 
coworker.
0.72
Walked away from your computer without locking it first.* 0.18
Security Damaging Behaviors 0.89
Used your social security number as your password. 0.81
Copied work information onto a personal USB drive to do work at home.
0.34
Installed unauthorized software from the internet onto your work computer 
without permission from your employer.
0.59
Attempted to crack the password on the firewall your company has set in 
place to assess prohibited websites while at work.
0.74
Introduced a Trojan horse program into your company’s network. 0.77
Used a file decryption program to discover the contents of a file containing 
information you are not authorized to see.
0.68
Used you company email to send spam messages for personal gain. 0.81
Communicated confidential information on an unsecured network. 0.58
Intentionally disclosed confidential company information to unauthorized 
sources. 
0.77
ote:  *Item removed from final scale. R = Composite Reliability
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Table 6. Model Fit Indices 
 
Model Model Description Satorra-Bentler Scaled χ2 df CFI TLI RMSEA (90% CI) SRMR 
1 Four Factor Model 346.815** 183 0.86 0.84 .06(.051-.07) 0.07 
2 
Four Factor Model 
with SRB7 removed 
290.99** 164 0.89 0.87 .057(.046-.068) 0.065 
Notes: *p < .05, **p < .01. CFI = comparative fit index; TLI – Tucker-Lewis index of fit; RMSEA = root mean square error of  
approximation; SRMR = Standardized root mean square residual. 
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Table 7. Means, Standard Deviations, Skewness, and Kurtosis of Study Variables 
 
  M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
1. Age 36.15 11.86 .91 .28 
2. Gender 1.53 0.50 -.11 -2.00 
3. Education 5.02 1.70 -.27 -.70 
4. Computer Use (Hours) 25.73 14.35 -.09 -.83 
5. Job Tenure (Years) 5.21 4.75 1.90 4.75 
6. Job Title (IT/non-IT) 0.07 0.25 3.53 10.52 
7. Severity of Punishment 3.73 0.94 -.75 .30 
8. Extraversion 2.93 0.82 .14 -.40 
9. Agreeableness 3.87 0.64 -.40 -.15 
10. Conscientiousness 3.82 0.62 -.32 -.04 
11. Emotional Stability 3.30 0.68 -.14 -.42 
12. Openness to Experience 3.78 0.61 -.17 -.18 
13. OCB-I 3.65 0.67 -.14 .04 
14. OCB-O 4.08 0.58 -.56 -.26 
15. Interpersonal Deviance 1.47 0.66 2.04 4.22 
16. Organizational Deviance 1.64 0.61 1.61 3.03 
17. Security Assurance Behaviors 3.48 1.50 .25 -.42 
18. Security Compliance Behaviors 5.48 1.39 -.85 .16 
19. Security Risk Behaviors 1.95 1.18 1.41 1.49 
20. Security Damaging Behaviors 1.46 0.81 2.66 7.28 
Note: Job Title is dichotomized     
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Table 8. Intercorrelations Among Study Variables  
 
 
Notes: N = 450-477; Job Title is dichotomized; *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Age -
2. Gender .05 -
3. Education .09 .00 -
4. Computer Use (Hours) .00 -.01 .14
** -
5. Job Tenure (Years) .42
*** .00 .02 .07 -
6. Job Title (IT/non-IT) .00 -.14
** -.01 .16
** .02 -
7. Severity of Punishment .00 -.01 -.09 -.01 -.03 .00 (.88)
8. Extraversion .05 .04 .01 -.04 .04 -.02 .01 (.89)
9. Agreeableness .23
***
.29
*** .01 -.04 .11
* -.05 .20
***
.30
*** (.87)
10. Conscientiousness .23
***
.19
***
.15
** .06 .15
** -.03 .17
***
.11
*
.39
*** (.84)
11. Emotional Stability .25
***
-.15
**
.16
** .04 .12
* .06 .09
*
.28
***
.26
***
.40
***
12. Openness to Experience .04 .07 .07 .04 -.05 -.05 .09 .22
***
.35
***
.33
***
13. OCB-I .05 .18
*** -.05 .03 .09 -.06 .21
***
.13
**
.36
***
.35
***
14. OCB-O .27
***
.15
** .01 .00 .09 -.05 .29
*** -.02 .42
***
.48
***
15. Interpersonal Deviance -.22
***
-.23
*** -.07 .00 -.05 -.01 -.11
* .00 -.40
***
-.40
***
16. Organizational Deviance -.23
***
-.16
** -.04 .01 -.08 -.02 -.14
** -.03 -.40
***
-.50
***
17. Security Assurance Behaviors .09 -.07 -.01 .01 .10
* .08 .20
*** .07 .15
**
.18
***
18. Security Compliance Behaviors .20
*** .04 .13
**
.14
** .07 .02 .19
*** .03 .29
***
.27
***
19. Security Risk Behaviors -.13
** .00 .00 -.03 -.01 -.04 -.15
** .08 -.14
**
-.21
***
20. Security Damaging Behaviors -.22
***
-.21
*** -.04 -.02 .00 .02 -.12
* .04 -.29
***
-.32
***
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Table 8 continued. Intercorrelations Among Study Variables 
 
 
Notes: N = 450-477; Job Title is dichotomized; *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1. Age
2. Gender
3. Education
4. Computer Use (Hours)
5. Job Tenure (Years)
6. Job Title (IT/non-IT)
7. Severity of Punishment
8. Extraversion
9. Agreeableness
10. Conscientiousness
11. Emotional Stability (.79)
12. Openness to Experience .24
*** (.84)
13. OCB-I .08 .29
*** (.78)
14. OCB-O .27
***
.29
***
.34
*** (.69)
15. Interpersonal Deviance -.24
***
-.21
***
-.13
**
-.56
*** (.91)
16. Organizational Deviance -.29
***
-.20
***
-.22
***
-.64
***
.83
*** (.90)
17. Security Assurance Behaviors .19
***
.11
*
.18
***
.15
** .00 -.06 (.63)
18. Security Compliance Behaviors .21
***
.27
***
.22
***
.44
***
-.34
***
-.31
***
.25
*** (.75)
19. Security Risk Behaviors -.18
***
-.16
*** .00 -.40
***
.43
***
.48
*** -.02 -.24
*** (.63)
20. Security Damaging Behaviors -.11
*
-.21
***
-.12
*
-.55
***
.61
***
.61
***
.16
***
-.25
***
.55
*** (.89)
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Table 9. Regression Results: Predicting Security Assurance Behaviors 
 
Model 1: Conscientiousness 2:  Agreeableness 
3: Openness to 
Experience 
Step 1: Controls    
Age .09* .09 .10* 
Gender -.07 -.08 -.07 
Computer Use .00 .01 .02 
Severity of Punishment .20*** .19*** .20*** 
Step 1 R2 .06*** .05*** .05*** 
Step 2: Direct Effects    
Age .06 .06 .09* 
Gender -.10* -.11* -.08 
Computer Use .00 .02 .02 
Severity of Punishment .18*** .16** .19*** 
1. Conscientiousness .15**   
2. Agreeableness  .14**  
3. Openness to 
Experience   .10* 
Total F  7.23*** 6.30*** 5.976*** 
Total R2 .08** .07** .06 
     ∆ R2 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Notes: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001   
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Table 10. Regression Results: Predicting Security Compliance Behaviors 
 
Model 1: Conscientiousness   
Step 1: Controls    
Age .21***   
Gender .03   
Computer Use .14**   
Severity of Punishment .18***   
Step 1 R2 .10***   
Step 2: Direct Effects    
Age .17***   
Gender -.01   
Computer Use .13**   
Severity of Punishment .15**   
1. Conscientiousness .19***   
Total F  13.45***   
Total R2 .13   
     ∆ R2 .03***   
Notes: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001   
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Table 11. Regression Results: Predicting Security Risk Behaviors 
 
Model 1: Conscientiousness  
Step 1: Controls   
Age -.13**  
Gender .01  
Computer Use -.03  
Severity of Punishment -.14**  
Step 1 R2 .04**  
Step 2: Direct Effects   
Age -.09  
Gender .04  
Computer Use -.02  
Severity of Punishment -.10*  
1. Conscientiousness -.18***  
Total F  6.17***  
Total R2 .06***  
     ∆ R2 0.03  
Notes: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001  
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Table 12. Regression Results: Predicting Security Damaging Behaviors 
 
Model 1: Conscientiousness 2:  Agreeableness 
3: Openness to 
Experience 
Step 1: Controls    
Age -.20*** -.22*** -.21*** 
Gender -.19*** -.19*** -.17*** 
Computer Use -.03 -.01 .00 
Severity of Punishment -.11* -.12** -.12** 
Step 1 R2 .09*** .10*** .09*** 
Step 2: Direct Effects    
Age -.15** -.18*** -.19*** 
Gender -.15** -.13** -.18*** 
Computer Use .00 -.01 .00 
Severity of Punishment -.06 -.08 -.11* 
1. Conscientiousness -.25***   
2. Agreeableness  -.19***  
3. Emotional Stability   -.08 
Total F  15.56*** 13.66*** 9.23*** 
Total R2 .15*** .13*** .09 
     ∆ R2 0.06 0.03 0.01 
Notes: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001   
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Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual relationship between cyber behaviors and organizational citizenship 
behaviors. 
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Figure 2. Conceptual relationship between cyber behaviors and counterproductive work 
behaviors. 
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Appendix A: Cyber-Security Behavior Scale 
 
Please indicate the frequency in which these you have engaged in each of the following 
behaviors in the past year. 
 
Response Options: 1 = “Never”; 2 = “Once a Year”; 3 = “Twice a Year”; 4 = “Several times a 
year”; 5 = “Monthly”; 6 = “Weekly”; 7 = “Daily”  
 
Behavior  Items Source 
Security Assurance SAB1 Monitored your work computer for signs of 
a virus or malware 
Stanton et al 
(2005) 
 SAB2 Immediately deleted suspicious emails in 
your work email without reading them 
Yoon et al 
(2012) 
 SAB3 Refused to tell anyone your work ID or 
password 
Yoon et al 
(2012) 
 SAB4 Used a secure password for your work 
computer. (i.e. a password containing a 
combination of letters, numbers, and 
symbols) 
Stanton et al 
(2005) 
 SAB5 Changed your password more frequently 
than your employer requires. 
Self-Developed 
 SAB6 Went above and beyond what is required of 
you in order to protect your work 
information. 
Self-Developed 
Security Compliance SCB1 Followed the information security policies 
and practices at work 
Hu et al. (2012) 
 SCB2 Used the information security technology 
provided to you at work. 
Hu et al. (2012) 
 SCB3 Used good information security practices at 
work. 
Hu et al. (2012) 
 SCB4 Complied with organizational information 
security policies to protect the organization's 
information systems. 
Herath & Rao 
(2009) 
Security Risk SRB1 Written your work password on a piece of 
paper and left it where others might see it. 
Stanton et al 
(2005) 
 SRB2 Chosen relatively simple passwords for your 
work computer. 
Stanton et al 
(2005) 
 SRB3 Shared your work account user name or 
password with a friend or coworker. 
Stanton et al 
(2005) 
 SRB4 Used your social security number as your 
password. 
Stanton et al 
(2005) 
 SRB5 Copied work information onto a personal 
USB drive to do work at home. 
Guo et al 
(2011) 
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 SRB6 Installed unauthorized software from the 
internet onto your work computer without 
permission from your employer. 
Guo et al 
(2011) 
 SRB7 Walked away from your computer without 
locking it first. 
Self-Developed 
Security Damaging SDB1 Attempted to crack the password on the 
firewall your company has set in place to 
assess prohibited websites while at work. 
Self-Developed 
 SDB2 Introduced a Trojan horse program into your 
company’s network. 
Stanton et al 
(2005) 
 SDB3 Used a file decryption program to discover 
the contents of a file containing information 
you are not authorized to see. 
Stanton et al 
(2005) 
 SDB4 Used you company email to send spam 
messages for personal gain. 
Stanton et al 
(2005) 
 SDB5 Communicated confidential information on 
an unsecured network. 
Self-Developed 
 SDB6 Intentionally disclosed confidential 
company information to unauthorized 
sources.  
Self-Developed 
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Appendix B: Big Five Personality Scales 
 
On the following pages, there are phrases describing people's behaviors. Please use the 
rating scale below to describe how accurately each statement describes you. Describe yourself as 
you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe yourself as you honestly see 
yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same sex as you are, and roughly your same 
age. So that you can describe yourself in an honest manner, your responses will be kept in 
absolute confidence. Please read each statement carefully, and then select an option on the scale. 
 
Response Options: 1 = “Very Inaccurate”; 2 = “Moderately Inaccurate”; 3 = “Neither Inaccurate 
nor Accurate”; 4 = “Moderately Accurate”; 5 = “Very Accurate”  
 
Neuroticism 
1. Am often down in the dumps. 
2. Dislike myself 
3. Often feel blue 
4. Have frequent mood swings. 
5. Panic easily. 
6. Am filled with doubts about things. 
7. Feel threatened easily. 
8. Get stressed out easily. 
9. Fear for the worst. 
10. Worry about things.   
11. Seldom feel blue. 
12. Feel comfortable with myself. 
13.  Rarely get irritated. 
14. Am not easily bothered by things. 
15. Am very pleased with myself. 
16. Am relaxed most of the time. 
17.  Seldom get mad. 
18. Am not easily frustrated. 
19. Remain calm under pressure. 
20. Rarely lose my composure. 
 
Extraversion 
 
1. Feel comfortable around people. 
2. Make friends easily. 
3. Am skilled in handling social situations. 
4. Am the life of the party. 
5. Know how to captivate people. 
6. Start conversations. 
7. Warm up quickly to others. 
8. Talk to a lot of different people at parties. 
9. Don't mind being the center of attention. 
10. Cheer people up.   
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11. Have little to say. 
12. Keep in the background. 
13. Would describe my experiences as somewhat dull. 
14. Don't like to draw attention to myself. 
15. Don't talk a lot. 
16. Avoid contacts with others. 
17. Am hard to get to know. 
18. Retreat from others. 
19. Find it difficult to approach others. 
20. Keep others at a distance. 
 
Openness to Experience 
 
1. Believe in the importance of art. 
2. Have a vivid imagination. 
3. Tend to vote for liberal political candidates. 
4. Carry the conversation to a higher level. 
5. Enjoy hearing new ideas. 
6. Enjoy thinking about things. 
7. Can say things beautifully. 
8. Enjoy wild flights of fantasy. 
9. Get excited by new ideas. 
10. Have a rich vocabulary. 
11. Am not interested in abstract ideas. 
12. Do not like art. 
13. Avoid philosophical discussions. 
14. Do not enjoy going to art museums. 
15. Tend to vote for conservative political candidates. 
16. Do not like poetry. 
17. Rarely look for a deeper meaning in things. 
18. Believe that too much tax money goes to support artists. 
19. Am not interested in theoretical discussions. 
20. Have difficulty understanding abstract ideas. 
 
Agreeableness 
 
1. Have a good word for everyone. 
2. Believe that others have good intentions. 
3. Respect others. 
4. Accept people as they are. 
5. Make people feel at ease. 
6. Am concerned about others. 
7. Trust what people say. 
8. Sympathize with others' feelings. 
9. Am easy to satisfy. 
10. Treat all people equally. 
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11. Have a sharp tongue. 
12. Cut others to pieces. 
13. Suspect hidden motives in others. 
14. Get back at others. 
15. Insult people. 
16. Believe that I am better than others. 
17. Contradict others. 
18. Make demands on others. 
19. Hold a grudge. 
20. Am out for my own personal gain. 
 
Conscientiousness 
 
1. Am always prepared. 
2. Pay attention to details. 
3. Get chores done right away. 
4. Carry out my plans. 
5. Make plans and stick to them. 
6. Complete tasks successfully. 
7. Do things according to a plan. 
8. Am exacting in my work. 
9. Finish what I start. 
10. Follow through with my plans.   
11. Waste my time. 
12. Find it difficult to get down to work. 
13. Do just enough work to get by. 
14. Don't see things through. 
15. Shirk my duties. 
16. Mess things up. 
17. Leave things unfinished. 
18. Don't put my mind on the task at hand. 
19. Make a mess of things. 
20. Need a push to get started. 
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Appendix C: Organizational Citizenship Behavior Scales 
 
Please indicate the frequency in which these you have engaged in each of the following 
behaviors in the past year. 
 
Response Options: 1 = “Never”; 2 = “Rarely”; 3 = “Sometimes”; 4 = “Most of the Time”; 5 = 
“Always” 
 
Interpersonally Directed OCBs 
 
1. I help others who have been absent. 
2. I help others who have heavy workloads. 
3. I assist my supervisor with his/her work when not asked. 
4. I take time to listen to co-workers’ problems and worries. 
5. I go out of my way to help new employees. 
6. I pass along information to co-workers. 
 
Organizationally Directed OCBs 
 
1. My attendance to work is about the norm. 
2. I give advance notice when unable to come to work. 
3. I take underserved work breaks. 
4. I spend a great deal of time with personal phone conversations. 
5. I complain about insignificant things at work. 
6. I adhere to informal rules devised to maintain order. 
  
67 
 
Appendix D: Counterproductive Work Behavior Scales 
 
Please indicate the frequency in which these you have engaged in each of the following 
behaviors in the past year. 
 
Response Options: 1 = “Never”; 2 = “Rarely”; 3 = “Sometimes”; 4 = “Most of the Time”; 5 = 
“Always” 
 
Interpersonally Directed CWBs 
 
1. Made fun of someone at work. 
2. Said something hurtful to someone at work. 
3. Made an ethnic, religious, or racial remark at work. 
4. Cursed at someone at work. 
5. Played a mean prank on someone at work. 
6. Acted rudely toward someone at work. 
7. Publicly embarrassed someone at work. 
 
Organizationally Directed OCBs 
 
1. Taken property from work without permission. 
2. Spent too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead of working. 
3. Falsified a receipt to get reimbursed for more money than you spent on business 
expenses. 
4. Taken an additional or longer break than is acceptable at your workplace. 
5. Come in late to work without permission. 
6. Littered your work environment. 
7. Neglected to follow your boss's instructions. 
8. Intentionally worked slower than you could have worked. 
9. Discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person. 
10. Used an illegal drug or consumed alcohol on the job. 
11. Put little effort into your work. 
12. Dragged out work in order to get overtime. 
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Appendix E: Severity of Punishment Scale 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements when thinking about 
your organization.  
 
Response Options: 1 = “Strongly Disagree”; 2 = “Disagree”; 3 = “Neither Agree nor Disagree”; 
4 = “Agree”; 5 = “Strongly Agree”  
 
1. The organization disciplines employees who break information security rules 
2. My organization terminates employees who repeatedly break security rules 
3. If I were caught violating organization information security policies, I would be severely 
punished 
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Appendix F: Demographics Questions 
 
What is your gender? 
 Male 
 Female 
 
What is your age in years? _____ 
 
Please indicate how long you have held your current job (in years). ______ 
 
On average, how many hours do you work per week? __________ 
 
How many hours per week do you use a computer at work?  _________ 
 
What is your job title? ______ 
 
Please indicate your highest level of education 
 Some high school 
 High school diploma/GED 
 Some college 
 Trade/technical/vocational training 
 Associate’s degree 
 Bachelor’s degree 
 Master’s degree 
 Professional degree 
 Doctoral degree 
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Appendix G: Institutional Review Board Approval Letter 
 
October 20, 2015 
 
 
Rachel  Dreibelbis 
Psychology 
4202 East Fowler Avenue 
PCD4118G 
Tampa, FL  33620 
 
 
RE: 
 
Exempt Certification 
IRB#: Pro00024125 
Title: The Nature of Cyber Security in the Workplace 
 
Dear Ms.  Dreibelbis: 
 
On 10/19/2015, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) determined that your research 
meets criteria for exemption from the federal regulations as outlined by 
45CFR46.101(b): 
 
(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, 
achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior, 
unless: 
(i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be 
identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of 
the human subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at 
risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, 
employability, or reputation. 
 
Approved Items: 
 
Study Protocol 
 
Informed Consent Document Revised 
 
 
 
As the principal investigator for this study, it is your responsibility to ensure that this 
research is conducted as outlined in your application and consistent with the ethical 
principles outlined in the Belmont Report and with USF HRPP policies and procedures. 
 
Please note, as per USF HRPP Policy, once the Exempt determination is made, the 
application is closed in ARC. Any proposed or anticipated changes to the study design that 
was previously declared exempt from IRB review must be submitted to the IRB as a new 
study prior to initiation 
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of the change. However, administrative changes, including changes in research personnel, do 
not warrant an amendment or new application. 
 
Given the determination of exemption, this application is being closed in ARC. This does 
not limit your ability to conduct your research project. 
 
We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject research at the 
University of South Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections.  If 
you have 
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Sincerely, 
 
 
 
John Schinka, Ph.D., Chairperson 
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